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On the one hand, the WTO. This institution that was considered the ‘jewel in the
crown’, has now been deprived of an Appellate body, a problem which is only
the tip of the iceberg. On the other hand, Brexit. Triggered by the referendum in
2016, postponed multiple times, a problem which seems to be here to stay, notably
considering the overwhelming win of the conservative party on 13th December.
Two subjects which at first sight seem completely unrelated. And yet, there is one
point where they align: their dispute settlement mechanism. Indeed, the dispute
settlement mechanism of the ‘Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy community’ (BWA) (which is one the few things the UK and the
EU seem to have settled in October 2019) seems to be a direct copy of the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism, notably Articles 21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU).
This Article will in particular examine whether with their mechanism the UK and
EU have actually managed to solve the inherent flaws of the WTO enforcement
mechanism, in particular the sequencing issues of Article 21.5 and 22.2, the lack of
retrospective remedies and the lack of review of retaliatory measures.
A succinct overview of the BWA Dispute Settlement mechanism:
The dispute settlement mechanism of the BWA is contained in Articles 167-181 of
the BWA. The first step in case of disputes is for the states to enter into consultations
in good faith (Articles 167 and 169). If no solution has been found within 3 months,
the UK or the EU may request the establishment of an arbitration panel which shall
be composed of five members picked from a list established by both states and
which shall be established within 15 days of the request (Articles 170 and 171).
The arbitration panel then has twelve months to notify its ruling to the UK or the EU
unless a party submits a request to the effect that the case is urgent in which case
the panel will have 15 days to give its ruling (Article 173). At any time a question
can be referred to the CJEU to interpret a provision of Union law during which the
proceedings shall be suspended (Article 174). The ruling of the panel is binding
(Article 175). The respondent has 30 days to notify the complainant of the time it
will require for compliance. In case of disagreement, the complainant can within 40
days of the notification ask the original panel to rule on the matter and determine
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the length of the reasonable period of time (RPT). The respondent shall inform the
complainant of its progress with complying (Article 176). If at the end of the RPT,
the complainant considers that the respondent has failed to comply, it may request
the arbitration panel to rule on the matter (Article 177). The arbitration panel may as
a result impose a lump sum or penalty payment to be paid to the complainant and
in case of no compliance authorize the suspension of obligations which should be
proportionate and temporary (Article 178 (1), (2) and (5) ). Should the respondent
feel that the measures are not proportionate it may request the original panel to rule
on the matter (Article 178(3)). Any temporary remedies shall be reviewed within 45
days of the notification by the respondent that it has brought itself in to conformity
with the ruling of the panel and the suspension of obligations shall be terminated
within 15 days (Article 179 ).
Between consultations, arbitration panels, the establishment of an RPT and
temporary remedies such as compensation or suspension of part of the Agreement,
there is clearly a very strong resemblance between the BWA and Articles 21 and 22
of the WTO DSU.
The BWA: A new and improved version of the WTO enforcement mechanism? 
The BWA would seem at first sight to be even more comprehensive than the WTO
system providing a sort of ‘fail safe’ should any issue in compliance arise. Not only
that, but a study of this agreement shows that it seems to have managed to resolve
some of the problems of the WTO enforcement mechanism:
First, it is no secret that there is a sequencing issue between Article 21.5 and 22.2 of
the WTO DSU. Indeed, states have had to resort to bilateral agreements to decide
which of the Articles would come first as there is absolutely no way to respect the
DSU’s tight deadline should a state want to go through both procedures. There
is no such type of inconsistency in the BWA between compliance and retaliation
proceedings as temporary remedies can only be awarded after a finding by the panel
that the respondent has failed to comply with the panel’s ruling. Article 177 of the
BWA therefore supersedes Article 178.
Second, contrary to the DSU which only provides for prospective compensation, the
BWA provides for retrospective reparations as the panel ‘shall take into account the
duration of the non-compliance and underlying breach of obligation’ (Article 178(1)
BWA). Furthermore, compensation is not dependant anymore on the agreement
of both parties as provided in Article 22.2 of the DSU but the ‘lump sum or penalty
payment’ will be imposed by an arbitration panel if it finds that the respondent
has failed to comply with its obligations (Article 178 BWA). This compensation
mechanism is in particular subject to a less tight deadline as the respondent has one
month to comply. This seems to solve the inherent flaw of the WTO enforcement
mechanism considering that as compensation has only been awarded in one single
case (US -Section 110(5) Copyright Act), it becomes in the end more profitable for
the respondent to simply keep the trade-restrictive measure in place
Third, the equivalence of suspension of concessions are less tightly regulated,
requiring suspensions within the same sector under the same agreement or a
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different sector within the same agreement etc. (Article 178(2) BWA) making it
perhaps easier to retaliate, thus encouraging compliance by fear of retaliation. One
big difference is especially that Article 179 BWA provides for a review of retaliatory
measures if the respondent argues that it has complied with the panel award and
the panel shall deliver its ruling within 45 days. On the contrary, in the DSU there is
absolutely no provision for the withdrawal of retaliatory measures a problem reflected
in two recent cases (EC-Hormones/US-Continued Suspension). As the WTO is an
institution advocating the liberalization of trade, this reliance on trade-restrictive
measures might seem a bit ironic.
A reform path for the WTO?
In spite of those flaws, the WTO enforcement mechanism has two obvious
strengths: First, it is one of the rare institutional mechanisms that actually provides a
mechanism to settle disputes after the award is rendered. Second, it provides for an
oversight of the implementation via the DSB monitoring.
On the other hand, the BWA is of course not a perfect agreement and has yet to
be tested in practice. Indeed, it provides for very tight time-limits which will have to
be managed especially in case of a question to the CJEU which might extend the
proceedings for quite a long time. Furthermore, it does not have a DSB to survey the
implementation of measures as the respondent shall only ‘inform the complainant in
writing of its progress in complying with the Arbitration panel ruling’ (Article 176(4)
BWA).
Nothing is sure about the future of the WTO. Is the crisis of its Appellate body the
beginning of the end for it or a much-needed wake-up call to reform? We will know
in a very short time. But this Article goes to show that the BWA could be a possible
reform path to tackle some specific issues regarding the WTO enforcement system
which could help in regulating the power-based future it is facing.
Furthermore, if even the UK and the EU, involved in one of the most contentious
issues of our time, could agree to what seems in theory to be a foolproof dispute
settlement mechanism, the powers involved in the WTO might want to learn a lesson
from it.
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